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When Clients Do

Bad Things
The Lawyer's Response to Corporate Wrongdoing
By C. Craig Bradley, Jr.

The high profile meltdowns
of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Adelphia, Global Crossing and
other well-known companies
have focused attention on the
responsibilities of corporate
gatekeepers, including attorneys, to deter or expose fraudulent conduct by their clients and
associated persons. Attorneys
have been the subject of investigation and criticism by Congress' andfederal regulators2 for
failing to adequately respond to
their clients 'fraudulent (and,
possibly, criminal) conduct. The
lawyer who learns that his or
her client or persons acting on
its behalf are engaged in a
course offraudulent or criminal
conduct which threatens economic losses to non-client third
parties faces both an ethical and
a moral dilemma. On the one
hand, the lawyer owes a professional duty to his or her client
to protect the confidentiality of
information communicated to
the lawyer during the representation. At the same time, what
responsibility does the lawyer
have to investors and others who
may suffer significantfinancial
losses as a result of the client's
undisclosed fraud?

This article summarizes the relevant rules of professional conduct
which guide a business lawyer's response to evidence of corporate
wrongdoing and discusses recent reform initiatives by the federal government and the organized bar to improve systems of corporate responsibility and accountability. It concludes
with a discussion of a recent ruling in
the securities fraud case brought by
investors against Enron's outside
counsel and the company's other professional and financial advisers for
their participation in structuring and
concealing Enron's allegedly fraudulent financing transactions.
Rules of Professional Conduct
The principal ethics rules governing a lawyer's response to suspected
fraud by an organizational client are
Model Rules 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), 1.13 (Organization as Client),
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) and 4.1 (Truthfulness in
Statements to Others). Each of these
rules is discussed below.
The Entity as Client
Model Rule 1.13 contains the basic core principle that the entity, and

not its various constituencies, is the
client. The rule states that a lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the entity (that is, the
organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents). The lawyer's duty is to serve the interests of
the organization and not the personal
interests of its officers, directors, employees and shareholders.' Although
the lawyer for the organization takes
direction from its officers, directors
and employees acting within the
scope of their authority on behalf of
the organization, the lawyer owes his
or her professional duties only to the
organization.
Rule 1.13 guides the corporate
lawyer who learns of possible misconduct by an officer or employee of
his or her client. The rule provides
that the lawyer shall proceed "as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization" if the lawyer knows that an officer, employee
or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action related to the representation that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the
organization or a violation of law
which is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization. Rule
1.13(b) provides a range of options
that the lawyer may (but is not required to) pursue to prevent harm to
the organization. The lawyer may
ask for reconsideration of the matter,
recommend that a separate legal
opinion be sought on the matter, or
refer the matter to a higher authority
within the organization. If the lawyer
has exhausted his or her remedial
options under Rule 1.13(b) and the
highest authority within the organization "insists upon action, or a refusal
to act, that is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer
may resign in accordance with Rule
1.16." Only misconduct that is related to the representation triggers the
lawyer's duties under Rule 1.13.
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The requirements of Rule 1.13
apply only if the lawyer "knows" of
the actual or intended misconduct on
the part of an officer, employee or
agent of the corporation. Under the
model rules, a lawyer "knows" a particular fact if he or she

Confidentiality
of Client Information

Rule 1.6 generally prohibits the
disclosure of information relating to
the representation of a client unless
the client gives an
informed consent.
has actual knowledge of
Paragraph (b) of
its existence. This falls
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Model Rule 1.6
short of the "reasonably
a small minority of
and the correshould know" standard
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analysis and improper assistance by
involving the representation. Addithe lawyer in the conduct of a client's
tionally, disclosure of client informacrime or fraud. It states in part:
tion is permitted to comply with other
law or a court order. It is not clear
The fact that a client uses adfrom a reading of the rules or the
vice in a course of action that
comments what is meant by "other
is criminal or fraudulent does
law" or the circumstances under
not, of itself, make a lawyer a
which disclosure would be allowed in
party to the course of action.
those instances. Comment [21] to
However, a lawyer may not
Kentucky Rule 1.6 notes that "a lawknowingly assist a client in
yer may be obligated or permitted by
criminal or fraudulent conduct.
other provisions of law to give inforThere is a critical distinction
mation about a client. Whether anbetween presenting an analysis
other provision of law supersedes
of legal aspects of questionable
Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation
conduct and recommending the
beyond the scope of these Rules, but
means by which a crime or
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such a supersession." This exception
impunity.
for laws outside the scope of the pro-
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fessional ethics rules provides an im-

portant option for lawyers in states
like Kentucky which don't specifically allow disclosures necessary to
prevent or rectify financial harm to
non-clients such as shareholders or
other investors. One expert on legal
ethics suggests that the lawyer may
elect, in the face of potential civil or
criminal liability for assisting a client's
fraud, to preemptively invoke the selfdefense exception in Rule 1.6(b) and
blow the whistle on the client's
wrongdoing before being implicated
personally.'
entucky is among a small
minority of states that do
ot permit disclosure to
third parties to prevent financial or
economic harm to others. Over forty
states currently permit or require
some form of disclosure to third parties to prevent a client from committing a criminal fraud.6 In its present
form, then, Kentucky Rule 1.6 significantly limits the options available to a
lawyer who learns of actual or potential corporate fraud in the course of
his or her representation of the organization.
The final report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000),
presented to the ABA House of Delegates in August 2001, proposed to
amend Model Rule 1.6(b) to expand
the grounds for permissive disclosure
of client information. Under the
changes recommended by the Ethics
2000 Commission, disclosure would
be permitted to prevent the client
from committing a crime or fraud
reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury, if it involves
the lawyer's services, and to prevent,
mitigate or rectify the consequences
of a client's financial fraud or crime
in furtherance of which the lawyer's
services were used. These proposals
were consistent with corresponding
provisions of the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of the

Law Governing Lawyers. 7 The Ethics 2000 recommendations were rejected by the House of Delegates.
Withdrawalfrom Representation
Model Rule 1.16 and the corresponding Kentucky ethics rule require
the lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client if the representation will result in a violation of law or
the rules of professional conduct.
The lawyer may withdraw if the client persists in conduct involving the
lawyer's services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent, or if the client has used
the lawyer's services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud.
Comments to the rules of professional conduct 8 indicate that, after
withdrawal, the lawyer is not prohibited from giving notice to third parties
of the fact of withdrawal, and may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like
to prevent its use in the client's continuing or intended future fraud (a
"noisy withdrawal"). ABA Formal
Opinion 92-366 confirms that the lawyer may withdraw or disaffirm work
product even though this may have
the collateral effect of disclosing inferentially confidential client information. The lawyer may not, however,
effect a noisy withdrawal and disaffirm work product if the client's fraud
is completed and the lawyer doesn't
know or reasonably believe that the
client intends to continue the fraud by
use of the lawyer's services.

Comment [3] to Rule 4.1 addresses the relationship between Rule
1.2(d) and Rule 4.1. The comment
notes that, in cases where the client's
crime or fraud takes the form of misrepresentations, substantive law may
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to
avoid being deemed to have assisted
the client's crime or fraud. "If the
lawyer can avoid assisting a client's
crime or fraud only by disclosing this
information, then under [Rule 4.1 (b)]
the lawyer is required to do so, unless
the disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6."
Knowledge
Standard and Duty of Inquiry
at duty does an
organization 's attorney
have to investigate facts
suggesting that an officer or employee of the organization is engaged
in improper or illegal activity that
could result in significant harm to the
interests of the organization or third
parties? Under Rule 1.13, the
organization's lawyer must pursue upthe-ladder reporting or other appropriW

Services Provided
•Timelines / Chronologies
* Expert witness location
* Medical Research
* Medical Record review and analysis
* Assess for missing records and tampering

Statements to Third Parties
Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person, or failing to disclose a material
fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure
is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

ate responses if the lawyer "knows"
that an agent of the organization is
engaged in conduct that violates a
legal obligation owed to the organization or constitutes a violation of law
which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization. Also, Rule 1.2(d)
prohibits a lawyer from assisting a
client in conduct that the lawyer
"knows" is criminal or fraudulent.
The permissive withdrawal provisions
of Rule 1.16 apply if the lawyer "reasonably believes" that a client is engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct. The model rules define "knowledge" and "knows" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," although
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. A "reasonable belief'
means that the lawyer "believes the
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable." Reasonableness is
measured by the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. The ABA Task Force report
recommends that lawyers should be
held to the "reasonably should know"
standard, which under the Model
Rules means "that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence
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would ascertain the matter in question."
It is not clear whether, in circumstances where a lawyer's professional responsibilities are predicated
upon actual knowledge of illegal or
improper corporate conduct, the lawyer has an independent duty of inquiry to investigate facts or circumstances which appear to the lawyer
to be inconsistent with statements or
directions from his or her client. The
ABA Task Force report concludes
that "while lawyers should not be
subject to discipline for simple negligence, they should not be permitted to
ignore the obvious." At least one
federal court has reached a similar
conclusion. In FDIC v. O'Melveny
& Myers,9 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its capacity as
receiver of a failed financial institution, brought an action for profes-

W.R. (Pat) Patterson, Jr.

sional negligence, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary
duty against attorneys retained by the
institution to prepare offering documents for two real estate syndications. In its complaint, the FDIC alleged that the law firm never communicated with the institution's current or previous auditors or attorneys
or its regulators regarding the
institution's financial condition. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that genuine issues of material fact
existed with regard to whether the
law firm fulfilled its professional duties to the client institution and reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the claims against it. The court
stated that the law firm, as part of its
professional duties to its client, was
required to make a "reasonable, independent investigation to detect and
correct false or misleading materials."

For almost 40 years, Pat Patterson has
represented plaintiffs and defendants in a wide
variety of litigation matters. Drawing upon that
experience, Pat is now continuing his established
mediation and arbitration practice as a member
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution practice
group at Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC.

Let Pat help you break through legal stalemates and find creative solutions to
your clients' legal disputes.
W.R. (Pat) Patterson, Jr
* Experienced litigator, representing claimants and defendants for 39 years
* Inducted as a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers
* Certified as a Civil Trial Advocate by the National Board of Trial Advocacy
* Listed, The Best Lawyers in America
* Completed Civil Mediator Certification Training Program
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Doll &McDonald
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ABA Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility
In

March 2002, the American
ar Association established a

~ask force to examine corporate governance and responsibility
issues raised by the collapse of Enron
and similar situations. The Task
Force was asked to "examine the
framework of laws and regulations
and ethical principles governing the
roles of lawyers, executive officers,
directors, and other key participants.
The issues will be studied in the context of the system of checks and balances designed to enhance the public
trust in corporate integrity and responsibility."
The Task Force issued a preliminary report on July 16, 2002.11 In its
report, the Task Force focused on
two areas: first, recommendations
for improving internal corporate governance systems and second, the
proper role of corporate attorneys in
promoting corporate responsibility.
On the subject of lawyer responsibility and conduct, the Task Force proposed a series of revisions to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to "help lawyers comply
with their duties to an organizational
client in circumstances in which corporate officers engage in or countenance criminal, fraudulent or deceptive conduct likely to cause harm to
the organization or its shareholders."
These proposals include:
" Amendments to Rule 1.13 to require a lawyer to pursue remedial
measures for misconduct, whether
the problem is related to the representation or learned through the
representation, and to communicate with higher corporate authority where other efforts to prevent
or rectify the problem fail.
" Amendments to Rule 1.6 to extend
permissible third party disclosure
to conduct that has resulted or is

reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, and
require disclosure under Rule 1.6
to prevent felonies or other serious
crimes, including violations of the
federal securities laws, where
such misconduct is known to the
lawyer. These amendments were
previously recommended by the
Ethics 2000 Commission and rejected by the ABA House of Delegates. The Task Force recommends that the House of Delegates reconsider the Ethics 2000
proposals.
Amendments to Rules 1.2(d), 1.13
and 4.1 to lessen the knowledge
standard for lawyers to take action
under these rules from actual
knowledge to circumstances in
which the lawyer reasonably
should know of the crime or fraud.
The Task Force recommendations
are expected to be presented to the
ABA House of Delegates for its consideration later this year.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
ection 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002'! directs
the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prescribe minimum
standards of conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the
Commission. The statute specifies
that the standards must include a rule
requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty
or similar violation by the company or
any agent acting on its behalf to the
chief legal officer or the chief executive officer. If the corporate officers
don't respond in an appropriate manner to the evidence, the attorney must
then report the evidence to the audit
committee, another committee of independent directors or the full board
of directors.

In January 2003, the Commission
adopted new rules implementing Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The
2
Commission's adopting release
clearly states that its new standards
are intended to preempt any conflicting or inconsistent state ethics rules.
Thus, for the first time, Congress and
the SEC have acted to federalize the
field of legal ethics and professional
responsibility. The rules require attorneys to report evidence of material
securities law violations or breach of
fiduciary duty to the issuer's chief
legal officer or the chief executive
officer and the chief legal officer and,
if those officers don't respond in an
appropriate manner, "up-the-ladder"
to a higher corporate authority, including the audit committee or the full
board of directors. If the company
has previously established a special
legal compliance committee of independent directors to receive and investigate allegations of corporate misconduct (a "qualified legal compliance
committee"), the attorney may instead report the evidence to the compliance committee. In this regard, the
basic up-the-ladder reporting model in
the new SEC rules is substantially
similar to Model Rule 1.13(b) and the
corresponding Kentucky ethics rule.
The SEC rules, which will become
effective August 5, 2003, apply to
attorneys "appearing and practicing"
before the Commission. The Commission has chosen to adopt a very
expansive definition which extends
beyond securities lawyers and attorneys who specifically counsel clients
on disclosure matters under the federal securities laws to include, among
others, non-securities attorneys who
participate in the preparation or review of any documents which the
attorney knows will be filed with or
submitted to the Commission.
For the most part, the rule covers
only those attorneys who represent
public companies before the SEC or
in connection with U.S. securities

laws. Attorneys advising non-public
companies in connection with exempt
securities offerings under the federal
securities laws, for example, would
be excluded from the rule. If the client company is a non-public subsidiary of a public company, however,
the attorney would be subject to the
rule if the legal services are provided
to the subsidiary "on behalf of, or at
the behest, or for the benefit of the
[public company parent], regardless
of whether the attorney is employed
or retained by the [parent]." The rule
also limits the internal reporting requirements to attorneys who provide
"legal services to an issuer with
whom the attorney has an attorneyclient relationship." Thus, attorneys
representing parties in privity of contract with the issuer, such as banks
and underwriters, and licensed attorneys employed by an organization in
non-legal capacities, would be excluded.
n attorney's obligation to
/L% report under these new
.L
les is triggered when the
attorney becomes aware of "evidence
of a material violation" by the company or by any director, officer, employee or agent of the company, of
any federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty or a
similar material violation of any federal or state law. Evidence of a material violation means "credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing or is about to
occur." In the adopting release for
the rule, the Commission states that,
for a violation to be "reasonably
likely," it "must be more than a mere
possibility, but it need not be 'more
likely than not'." The Commission
rejected suggestions from
commenters that the up-the-ladder
reporting obligations be triggered only

A
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when an attorney knows that a material violation has occurred.
Following an attorney's initial report to the chief legal officer or the
chief executive officer, the corporate
officer must investigate the evidence
and respond to the attorney. The appropriateness of the officer's response is to be measured both subjectively and objectively. The attorney
will have no further reporting requirement if, as a result of the response to
his or her report of a material violation, the attorney reasonably believes
that (a) no material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur,
(b) the issuer has adopted appropriate
remedial measures, or (c) the issuer
has retained an attorney to review the
reported evidence and either has
implemented the attorney's remedial
recommendations or has been advised that the attorney may assert
colorable defenses on its behalf. Unless the attorney receives an appropriate response he or she is then obligated to report the matter to a higher
authority within the organization, including the audit committee, another
committee of non-employee directors
or the full board of directors. If the
attorney chose to report the evidence
directly to a qualified legal compliance committee, the attorney would
have no further obligations under the
rules.
Importantly, the rules permit, but
don't require, an attorney appearing
and practicing before the Commission
to reveal to the Commission, without
the company's consent, confidential
information related to the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary to prevent
substantial injury to the financial interests of investors. The SEC provision,
then, directly conflicts with (and preempts) Kentucky Supreme Court
Rule 3.130 (1.6), which allows disclosure of confidential client information
only to prevent imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. This pre10
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emption should provide grounds for
an attorney to report evidence of improper corporate conduct to the SEC
without risk of disciplinary action under the Kentucky rules of professional conduct.
The Commission's initial rule proposal included provisions which would
require attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission to effect a "noisy withdrawal" from representation if a reporting attorney, after
fully complying with the internal upthe-ladder reporting requirements of
the rule, didn't receive an appropriate
response to his or her report of a material violation. Specifically, an attorney retained by the issuer who reasonably believes that a material violation likely to result in substantial injury
to the financial interests of the issuer
or its investors is ongoing or about to
occur has fully reported evidence of
that material violation up-the-ladder
as required by
the rule and

not received
an appropriate
response
would then be
required to:

and that the attorney reasonably
believes is or may be materially
false or misleading.
If, instead of referring evidence of
the potential misconduct initially to the
company's chief legal officer or chief
executive officer and then to a higher
authority within the corporation, the
attorney elected in the first instance
to report the matter to a qualified legal compliance committee, the attorney would be relieved of the obligation to report his or her withdrawal
outside the corporation.
This "noisy withdrawal" proposal
attracted loud criticisms from
commenters who feared that the new
requirement would conflict with existing state ethics rules and interfere
with attorney-client relationships.
Commenters also questioned the
Commission's authority under Section
307 of Sarbanes-Oxley to require a
"noisy with-

The traditional common law
rule is that attor ieys owe their
fiduciary duties only to their
clients, not to nc)n-client third
parties.

" Withdraw

forthwith
from representing the issuer, indicating that
the withdrawal is based on professional considerations;
*Within one business day of withdrawing, give written notice to the
Commission of the attorney's
withdrawal, indicating that the
withdrawal is based on professional considerations; and
" Promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, document, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document
filed with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such
a document, that the attorney has
prepared or assisted in preparing

drawal." In
response to
these concerns, the
Commission
deferred action on its initial noisy with-

drawal proposal and proposed an alternative requirement that
issuers, rather than attorneys, report
the fact of an attorney's withdrawal
3
to the Commission.

Attorneys as Whistleblowers
and the Duty to Speak:
The Enron Case
The traditional common law rule is
that attorneys owe their fiduciary duties only to their clients, not to nonclient third parties. Thus, in the absence of an affirmative duty to speak,
silence is generally not actionable and
attorneys would not be liable for failing to blow the whistle on their cli-

ents' ongoing or intended fraud.
Nevertheless, some courts have held
lawyers accountable when an attorney voluntarily undertakes to communicate directly with non-clients in securities transactions who rely on misstatements or omissions by the attorney. In a 1998 opinion from the Sixth
Circuit, 4 the court held that "while an
attorney representing the seller in a
securities transaction may not always
be under an independent duty to volunteer information about the financial
condition of his client, he assumes a
duty to provide complete and
nonmisleading information with respect to subjects on which he undertakes to speak." The court further
stated that an attorney who prepares
a false or misleading document may
be held liable as a primary violator of
the federal securities laws even
though direct negotiations with the
securities purchasers were conducted
by others.
The risk to an attorney or law firm
of not speaking out about a client's
misconduct is vividly illustrated by a
recent memorandum opinion and order issued in Newby, et al. v. Enron
Corporation, et al. 5 A group of"secondary actors" including accountants,
lawyers, banks and investment bankers for Enron were sued by investors
for securities fraud under federal and
state securities laws. The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that, under the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 6 they couldn't be
held liable as aiders and abettors of
Enron's primary securities law violations. In a controversial ruling, the
court refused to dismiss the claims
against one of Enron's principal outside law firms. After a lengthy review of the professional ethics rules
and case law relevant to the duty of
an attorney to disclose nonmisleading
information about his or her client to
nonclients and third parties, the court

concluded that "professionals, including lawyers

. .

C. Craig

., when they take the

affirmative step of speaking out,
whether individually or as essentially
an author or co-author in a statement
or report, whether identified or not,
about their client's financial condition,
do have a duty to third parties not in
privity not to knowingly or with severe recklessness issue materially
misleading statements on which they
intend or have reason to expect that
those third parties will rely." The
opinion contains a lengthy and detailed account of the allegations in the
complaint regarding the law firm's
extensive participation in the preparation and review of Enron's filings with
the SEC, press releases and shareholder reports and the structuring and
documentation of numerous financial
transactions on behalf of Enron. The
complaint alleges that these financing
transactions were not legitimate
arms-length commercial transactions
but rather manipulative arrangements
which Enron's attorneys knew were
designed to disguise the company's
true financial condition. The court
found that the law firm was "not
merely a drafter, but essentially a coauthor of the documents it created for
public consumption concealing its
own and other participants' actions."
For this reason and because it directed the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations publicly to potential investors, credit rating agencies and
banks to maintain Enron's financial
condition, it had a duty to be accurate
and truthful. In contrast, the court
dismissed claims against a second
law firm on the grounds that its work
product on behalf of Enron never
reached the public and that traditional
rules of attorney-client privilege and
privity protected it against investors'
claims.
Conclusion
In the post-Enron reform era, legislators, regulators and the courts will
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be looking closely at the role of attorneys in the corporate governance system. Greater accountability will be
expected from lawyers whose services and professional advice contribute materially to a client's financial
fraud or crime. At some point, traditional ethics principles of non-disclosure, privity and attorney-client privilege must be subordinated to the interests of investors and shareholders
who suffer substantial financial losses
as a result of corporate fraud. Efforts
like the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility are a meaningful
and commendable step in the process
of rethinking professional ethics rules
to achieve an appropriate balancing of
these interests.
0
Endnotes appear on page 61
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